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When an individual estimates the temporal interval between a voluntary action and a
consequent effect, their estimates are shorter than the real duration. This perceived
shortening has been termed “intentional binding”, and is often due to a shift in the
perception of a voluntary action forward towards the effect and a shift in the perception
of the effect back towards the action. Despite much work on binding, there is virtually
no consideration of individual/personality differences and how they affect it. Narcissism
is a psychological trait associated with an inflated sense of self, and individuals higher
in levels of subclinical narcissism tend to see themselves as highly effective agents.
Conversely, lower levels of narcissism may be associated with a reduced sense of
agency. In this exploratory study, to assess whether individuals with different scores on
a narcissism scale are associated with differences in intentional binding, we compared
perceived times of actions and effects (tones) between participants with high, middle,
and low scores on the narcissistic personality inventory (NPI). We hypothesized that
participants with higher scores would show increased binding compared to participants
with lower scores. We found that participants in our middle and high groups showed a
similar degree of binding, which was significantly greater than the level of binding shown
by participants with the lowest scores. To our knowledge, these results are the first to
demonstrate that different scores on a personality scale are associated with changes in
the phenomenological experience of action, and therefore underscore the importance
of considering individual/personality differences in the study of volition. Our results also
reinforce the notion that intentional binding is related to agency experience.
Keywords: intentional binding, agency, narcissism, narcissism and agency, narcissism and intentional binding,
subjective time, awareness of action
INTRODUCTION
Whereas there is large body of research on the production
and control of human action, there is less work devoted to
understanding the subjective experience of action (Rosenbaum,
1991; Haggard, 2001; Obhi and Goodale, 2005). The sense
of agency refers to the feeling of control over self-produced
actions and, as a consequence, the feeling of being a causal
agent capable of effecting change in the environment (Gallagher,
2012; Moore and Obhi, 2012). The sense of agency can be
either an explicit phenomenologically rich conscious experience
of control, or can be relatively phenomenologically “thin”, such
as when a person “knows” that they acted to cause some
effect, but such knowledge does not become the focus of
conscious awareness. Understanding the neurocognitive processes
that underlie both forms of agency experience has become an
important goal for cognitive neuroscience and experimental
psychology.
To the extent that actions produce effects in the environment,
they can be considered as operant. From over a decade of
research, an important finding is that, when such operant
actions are made volitionally, the actor perceives the time
interval between the action and the consequent effect to be
shorter than its true value (Haggard et al., 2002; see Moore
and Obhi, 2012 for a review). More specifically, this illusory
interval compression usually manifests as a perception that
the initiation of action occurs later than it actually did, and
a perception that the effect occurred earlier than it actually
did, although in certain cases effects have been found on the
percept of one component of the action-effect complex and
not the other. Interestingly, if the person is made to perform
the action (and thus produce the effect) involuntarily, either by
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of the motor cortex,
or by other mechanical means, the perceived shortening of the
action-effect interval does not occur (Tsakiris and Haggard,
2003). The apparent dependence of this temporal illusion on
intention seems to support the notion that the illusion may
be linked to the sense of agency. The illusion has thus been
referred to as “intentional binding”. The potential link between
intentional binding and the sense of agency is intriguing and has
spawned considerable interest from researchers in experimental
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org February 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 13 | 1
Hascalovitz and Obhi Personality and intentional binding
psychology and cognitive neuroscience, although it is noteworthy
that some researchers have exercised caution in interpreting the
effect in terms of intentional processes and instead consider it as
a special case of more general cause-effect processing (Buehner,
2012).
In this light, and in order to better understand whether
intentional binding is linked to agency, it is necessary to
investigate the conditions under which intentional binding
occurs, with specific regard to the personal and situational
factors that modulate the magnitude of the effect. This has often
been done using experimental manipulations of action-effect
contingency which influence the ability to predict the outcome
of actions, and has even extended into questions about the moral
status of an outcome, joint actions and the effects of recalling
memories of power and depression (Moore et al., 2009; Moretto
et al., 2011; Obhi and Sebanz, 2011; Obhi et al., 2012, 2013).
Another approach has been to assess binding in patients
who are known to have deficits in the production, control and
subjective experience of action. In this regard, patients such as
those with schizophrenia, Parkinson’s disease and psychogenic
conversion disorders have been found to display “abnormal”
patterns of binding (Haggard et al., 2003; Kranick et al., 2013).
However, despite some limited work in patient populations,
to date, there has been no research investigating the effects
of variation in specific personality traits on binding. Indeed,
more generally, the question of how action is experienced by
individuals with different psychological profiles remains largely
ignored.
Similar to the patient approach, studying the relationship
between personality traits and binding could be useful in
shedding light on the purported link between binding and agency.
Specifically, individuals who possess traits that are linked to
differences in the tendency to act, or to the perception of the
self as a powerful entity, might be expected to show differences
in binding. In the present study, to further investigate the notion
that binding is linked to agency, we contrasted neurologically
normal individuals who differ on their scores on the narcissistic
personality inventory (NPI), a commonly used index of sub-
clinical narcissism in social psychological research. Narcissism
is a personality trait that has been linked to an inflated sense
of self, a tendency toward high levels of dominance motivation
and dominance behavior, and a perception of the self as a
powerful agent (Kohut, 1977; Raskin et al., 1991; Morf and
Rhodewalt, 2001). Despite this stereotypical view of the powerful
and dominant narcissist, it is worth noting that accounts of
clinical narcissists often reveal a rather fragile picture in which
narcissists are prone to feelings of emptiness, a lack of belonging
and fluctuating self-esteem. Indeed, Kohut has argued that
behind the grandiosity, lies low self-esteem (Kohut, 1971). Others
suggested that narcissists overcome this situation via greater
than normal self-enhancement (John and Robins, 1994). In
their proposal for an integrated model of narcissism, Dimaggio
et al. (2002) observe that narcissists often engage in an ever-
escalating process of self-enhancement, which they employ to
protect fragile self-esteem. These authors suggest that narcissists
do not have the requisite metacognitive skills to understand why
they don’t fit in, and they tend to deal with such situations
which leave them feeling disconnected and separate, by self-
administering self-esteem tests, which they tend to pass due
to self-enhancement. This process has been associated with
threatening swings in self-esteem, which further contribute to
the fragility of the narcissistic mindset (Ronningstam, 2011a;
for more on manifestation of clinical narcissism see Dimaggio
et al., 2006, 2008). However, individuals with sub-clinical levels
of narcissism, do appear to maintain a higher level of self-esteem
and self-agency and are therefore somewhat more stable than
their clinical coutnerparts (Ackerman et al., 2011). Individuals
who score higher on subclinical narcissism have been shown
to pursue dominance behaviors in order to maintain their
grandiose sense of self, and from an evolutionary perspective,
to gain better access to resources via increased social status
(Baumeister et al., 2000; Kirkpatrick et al., 2002). Indeed,
when scores on measures such as the NPI are examined in
relation to scores on self-report measures of agency, there
is a strong positive correlation between the two (Campbell
et al., 2007). This finding, coupled with the purported link
between agency and intentional binding, makes it important to
characterize the relationship between narcissism and intentional
binding.
In the current study, to shed more light on the link between
scores on the NPI, intentional binding and agency, we recruited
individuals who had previously completed the NPI. We allocated
individuals to a high, middle, and low groups based on the range
of NPI scores in our sample and ran each participant through
an intentional binding experiment. During this intentional
binding task, participants were asked to judge the onset time
of actions and consequent effects. The task involved making
an action (clicking a mouse), experiencing an effect (hearing
a tone), and making an action that resulted in a subsequent
effect (clicking the mouse to produce the tone), while watching
clock hand rotate on a computer screen (Haggard et al., 2002).
During the different conditions, participants reported where
the clock hand was when they clicked the mouse or heard
the tone. By calculating the difference between the perceived
time of the action when it did not produce a tone against
when it did produce a tone, and the perceived time of the
tone when it was preceded by an action against when it was
not preceded by an action, we determined the intentional
binding effect. Importantly, intentional binding is thought to
represent an implicit measure of the sense of agency (see
Moore and Obhi, 2012 for a review). Given the purported link
between narcissism and agency, we predicted that individuals
with higher NPI scores would demonstrate significantly greater
levels of intentional binding compared to those with lower NPI
scores.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty-seven university students (nine males and 18 females,
age 17–20, Mean 18.3, SD 0.73) participated in the study for
a course credit or $11 compensation. Each participant was run
individually in a single cubicle with the researcher present. The
participants had all been previously screened online using the NPI
and grouped into the high and low narcissism group prior to the
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experiment based on the distribution of scores on the NPI taken as
part of mass testing. Specifically, participants were allocated to the
“high” group if their score on the NPI was over 21 out of a possible
40, and participants were allocated to the “low” group if their
NPI score was less than 10. The middle group was created based
on the distribution of scores between the high and low groups,
and was comprised of individuals who scored between 11–17 on
the NPI. This resulted in the inclusion of nine participants in
each of the three groups. All participants completed a written
consent form at the beginning of the study. It is important to
note that being placed into the high group does not correspond
to being a pathological “narcissist” and we are not making
any claims in this paper about narcissistic personality disorder
(NPD). Indeed, the label “high” in this paper simply refers to a
relatively high score in the range of scores we obtained in the
current sample. Our simple aim in this exploratory study was
to assess whether there are measurable differences in intentional
binding associated with individuals whose score on the NPI
differs.
APPARATUS AND STIMULI
The experiment was programmed using Superlab version 4.5
(Cedrus Corporation, San Pedro, CA, USA) and was run on
a Lenovo computer, with stimuli displayed on a 19-inch LCD
monitor. A Microsoft serial mouse was used to register the
voluntary key press (left click). Auditory tones (100 ms, 1000 Hz,
were presented over Dell Desktop speakers situated either side of
the computer monitor).
PROCEDURE
Participants completed the experiment one at a time with the
experimenter present in a testing cubicle. Participants were
instructed to watch a small clock (2.5 cm diameter, marked at
5 min intervals) rotate on the computer screen and, depending
on the condition, to report where the clock hand was when they
either pressed the key or heard the tone (between 0 and 59, see
Haggard et al., 2002; Obhi and Hall, 2011 for a similar approach).
There were four different conditions, or blocks, that each subject
completed in a pseudo-random order: baseline action, baseline
effect, operant action and operant effect (Figure 1). Each block
had 60 trials and clock hand starting position was pseudo-
randomly varied. In the baseline action condition, participants
were instructed to click the mouse at a time of their own
choosing (and not in response to position of the clock hand).
After their key press, the clock hand continued to rotate for a
variable amount of time. At the end of the trial, participants
were asked to report to the researcher where the clock hand
was when they initiated their voluntary action. In the baseline
effect condition, participants were asked not to produce a key
press, but instead watch the clock and report the clock hand
position at the time a randomly occurring tone sounded (tone
could occur between 1600 and 3600 ms after the appearance of
the clock). In the operant action condition, participants were
again instructed to click the mouse at a time of their own
choosing after the appearance of the clock. Upon clicking the
mouse, a tone sounded and, at the end of the trial, participants
were asked to report where the clock hand was when they
clicked the mouse, not when they heard the tone. Finally,
in the operant effect condition, participants again clicked the
mouse at a time of their own choosing, which again produced
a tone. On these trials however, participants were asked to
report where the clock hand was when they heard the tone,
not when they clicked the mouse. At the beginning of each
block, participants completed five practice trials to familiarize
themselves with the procedure. Practice trials were not included
in the analysis.
RESULTS
For each participant, action and tone judgments that deviated
more than 2.5 standard deviations from the mean judgment for
a particular condition were excluded. This resulted in the removal
of less than 1% of trials. Remaining action and tone judgment
data were subjected to inferential statistical analysis.
CALCULATING ACTION, TONE AND TOTAL SHIFTS
To determine perceptual shifts, we first calculated judgment errors
by quantifying the difference between judgments of actions and
tones compared to their veridical onset times, for both baseline
and operant conditions. The difference between these judgment
errors for baseline and operant conditions was taken as the
perceived shift. In addition, the overall “degree of binding” (or
“total shift”) was determined by calculating the extent to which
the perceived times of actions and tones moved towards each
other. This was calculated as: (Action shift) + (−1xTone shift) (see
Figure 2).
NPI SCORE AND AGENCY
The three groups were classified as follows: High NPI score, who
had scores greater than 21, Middle NPI scores who had scores
between 11–17, and Low NPI scores, who had scores between 3–9.
Participant binding data from the three groups were entered into
three separate one-way ANOVAs for analysis. There was a main
effect of group on Tone shift (F(2,24) = 3.759, p < 0.05), as well
as on Total shift (F(2,24) = 3.643, p < 0.05). However there was
no effect of group on Action shift (F(2,24) = 0.319, p > 0.05).
Follow up independent samples t-tests were run to investigate the
difference in the degree of shift between High, Middle and Low
groups (mean shift data for actions and effects are presented in
Figure 3, overall binding data is presented in Figure 4).
HIGH VS. LOW NPI SCORES
Follow up independent samples t-tests were run to investigate the
difference in the degree of shift between High and Low NPI score
participants (mean shift data for actions and effects is presented
in Figure 3, and overall binding is presented in Figure 4). The
t-test revealed a significant difference for tone shifts (High: Mean
= −130.97, SD = 46.25 < Low: Mean = −65.18, SD = 71.20,
t(16) = 2.325, p = 0.034) and overall binding (High: Mean =
157.40, SD = 51.08 > Low: Mean = 100.20, SD = 45.94, t(16) =
−2.498, p = 0.024), but not for action shifts (High: Mean = 26.36,
SD = 26.73 < Low: Mean = 18.62, SD = 13.03, t(15) = −0.304,
p = 0.765).
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FIGURE 1 | Procedure for the intentional binding experiment, labeled BA, BE, OA and OE for: baseline action, baseline effect, operant action and
operant effect conditions.
FIGURE 2 | Illustrates how action, tone, and overall degree of binding
(i.e., total shift) are calculated. AJB: Action judgment in baseline
condition, TJB: Tone judgment in baseline condition. AJO: Action judgment
in operant condition, TJO: Tone judgment in operant condition.
LOW VS. MIDDLE NPI SCORES
The t-tests also revealed a significant difference for tone shifts
between Middle and Low groups (Middle: Mean = −131.05,
SD = 56.28 < Low: Mean = −65.18, SD = 71.20, t(16) = 2.177,
p = 0.045) (see Figure 3), and for overall degree of binding
(Middle: Mean = 152.67, SD = 52.45 > Low: Mean = 100.20,
SD = 45.94, t(16) = −2.258, p = 0.038) (see Figure 4), but not
action shift (Middle: Mean = 21.62, SD = 25.02 > Low: Mean =
18.62, SD = 13.03, t(15) =−0.304, p = 0.765) (see Figure 3).
MIDDLE VS. HIGH NPI SCORES
The High and Middle groups did not significantly differ on the
action (Middle: Mean = 21.62, SD = 25.02 < High: Mean =
26.36, SD = 26.73, t(16) = −0.388, p = 0.703) or effect shifts
(Middle: Mean =−131.05, SD = 56.28<High: Mean =−130.97,
SD = 46.25, t(16) = −0.003, p = 0.998) (see Figure 3), nor on
overall binding (Middle: Mean = 152.67, SD = 52.45 < High:
Mean = 157.40, SD = 51.08, t(16) = −0.914, p = 0.849) (see
Figure 4).
DISCUSSION
The current study investigated whether individuals who differ
on their score on the NPI also show different patterns of
intentional binding when making judgments about the onsets of
voluntary actions and their effects. Given that narcissistic traits are
associated with increased dominance motivation and behavior,
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FIGURE 3 | The mean action shift and mean tone shift for the low,
middle and high NPI score group. Tone shift was significantly greater in
the high and middle groups compared to the low group. Error bars are SEM.
See text for statistics.
FIGURE 4 | The mean total degree of binding (in ms) for the low,
middle, and high NPI score groups; the high and middle group showed
significantly more binding than the low group. Error bars are SEM. See
text for statistics.
an over-inflated sense of self-importance and a tendency to seek
out social power as a means to maintain high social status, we
hypothesized that those who scored higher on the NPI would
exhibit a correspondingly greater degree of intentional binding.
Our prediction was borne out by the results. Individuals with
higher NPI scores did indeed display greater levels of binding
than those with low NPI scores, although the effect was entirely
driven by shifts in perception of the tone. Interestingly the middle
group displayed tone binding that was indistinguishable from
the high group. This is most likely due to the fact that none
of our participants scored anywhere near the maximum NPI
score of 40. Thus, one limitation of the current initial study,
is that our groups, although split on the basis of the range of
NPI scores we obtained, did not include scores at the upper
end of the NPI scale itself. Thus, high and middle levels of
narcissism in our sample, perhaps corresponded to a single
“moderate” group and may reflect healthy levels of narcissism
(Maxwell et al., 2011). Indeed, it could be argued that, in the
absence of obtaining scores right at the high end of the NPI
scale, we are not dealing with narcissism at all in the current
sample. However, we do have different ranges of NPI scores
and to avoid mislabeling a moderate NPI score as a moderate
level of narcissism, we simply refer to moderate NPI scores
instead of middle and high narcissism, for the remainder of the
discussion.
Not withstanding the lack of high NPI scores, our results
show a clear difference in binding between individuals with
moderate NPI scores and low NPI scores. Importantly the low
group did contain scores as low as 3, and therefore our results
are consistent with reduced agency for individuals at the low
end of the NPI scale. Indeed, low scores on the NPI may be
comorbid with other psychological characteristics such as low
self-esteem, anxiety and/or depression, which have been shown
to be related to a reduced sense of agency (Barlow, 1991; Keeton
et al., 2008; Obhi et al., 2012, 2013). Despite the lack of very
high NPI scores in the current study, overall, our results provide
the first evidence that different scores on a personality trait are
associated with differences in the degree of binding of effects
to voluntary actions, and by extension, pre-reflective agentic
experience.
Our results suggest that even moderate scores on the
NPI might be linked to a stronger sense of agency and
increased intentional binding for voluntary actions and outcomes,
compared to lower levels of narcissism. Furthermore, while it is
well known that narcissists often over-estimate their intelligence
and their academic abilities (Robins and Beer, 2001; Campbell
et al., 2002), among other things, it may be that those who score
very low on the NPI may correspondingly under-estimate their
abilities. Specifically, the decreased level of tone binding they
display suggests that they may particularly under-estimate the
degree of control they have over the outcomes that their actions
produce. Given that low self-esteem has been linked to risk for
depression (Orth et al., 2008), and that we recently showed that
activating memories of depression reduces intentional binding
(Obhi et al., 2013), one plausible explanation for the current
pattern of data is indeed that individuals with low NPI scores
are less psychologically “healthy” than their moderate scoring
counterparts, and one consequence of this is that they have
diminished agentic experience. Binding is an intriguing method
for examining differences in the experience of voluntary action
and further research is required to clarify the precise relationship
between narcissism, psychological health and agency. This study
represents an initial demonstration that such a relationship may
exist, and is therefore worthy of further investigation. More
generally, this study underscores that personality differences do
impact the experience of voluntary action and thereby open
up a new area of inquiry for researchers working on volitional
action.
A noteworthy aspect of the current results is that the action-
outcome complex that was employed in the experiment was
arbitrary (a key press followed by an auditory tone) and
did not involve control over other social agents. An obvious
and potentially illuminating extension of this work involves
comparing binding for arbitrary action outcomes such as lights
and tones, with social outcomes such as “winning”, “losing” or
influencing the actions of another individual (see Obhi et al.,
2012 for a similar approach). Indeed, previous authors have
commented on the tendency for narcissists to subjugate others
in their social environment and “use” them in the service of
their own goals (Dimaggio et al., 2002). One prediction is that
such manipulations would increase the influence of narcissism on
binding.
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Future work might consider investigating intentional binding
in patients with clinical narcissism. Since NPD has been more
recently associated with a deeply held sense of low self-esteem
(Ronningstam, 2011b), the intentional binding effect in patients
may mimic those who had abnormally low scores on the NPI.
Unlike trait anxiety, which is highly correlated to anxiety disorder
(Grupe and Nitschke, 2013), narcissism as a personality trait
(measured on the NPI) is often not well correlated to the full-
blown experience of narcissistic disorder. Thus, non-patients
tend to score lower on the NPI than healthy participants,
and higher scoring on the NPI by narcissists could simply be
a function of response bias (John and Robins, 1994; Pincus
and Lukowitsky, 2010). Furthermore, some researchers have
suggested that the sense of agency in NPD is more vulnerable
and experiences more fluctuations than that in non-narcissists.
In view of this it would be beneficial to test clinical narcissists
on the intentional binding task and to measure how the degree
of binding changes after receiving criticism, or other types
of feedback. Changes in binding, as a function of the social
circumstance, may explain the variability experienced in self-
agency by narcissists, and can further aid to explain why
narcissists tend to shift between different periods of high and
low functioning (Ronningstam, 2013; Ronningstam and Baskin-
Sommers, 2013). Again though, we underline that in the current
study we simply measured NPI scores and determined whether
different scores were associated with differences in binding. We
likely did not have “real” narcissists in our sample and thus our
ideas for future work on clinical samples must be treated as
speculative.
There has been considerable research interest in intentional
binding since it was first reported in 2002 (Haggard et al., 2002;
Moore and Obhi, 2012). Out of this research, strong support
for the notion that preparatory and predictive, processes play
an important role in binding, and particularly tone binding, has
emerged. The comparator model is an influential model of motor
control that posits interaction between a prediction of the sensory
consequences of pending movement and the actual sensory
consequences of the movement (Blakemore et al., 1999). This
comparator model has been invoked in the study of agency and
it has been shown that when accurate prediction is not possible,
the sense of agency, and intentional binding is reduced (Haggard
and Clark, 2003; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2003). Specifically, an
influential model of agency proposes that when the prediction
of the sensory consequences of an action and the actual sensory
consequences match, agency is experienced, whereas, when they
do not match, the action is not attributed to the self (Blakemore
et al., 2002).
The supplementary motor area (SMA) is thought to be a
key region involved in action preparation and prediction as well
as the conscious experience of motor intentions (Fried et al.,
1991; Makoshi et al., 2011; Moore and Obhi, 2012). Interestingly,
theta burst TMS over the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-
SMA) has been shown to reduce tone binding in neurologically
normal participants, apparently confirming a key role for the
pre-SMA in subjective experience of action effects (Moore et al.,
2010). More generally, prediction has been purported as a
fundamental brain process that enables successful navigation of
the environment, both physical and social (e.g., Bubic et al., 2010).
Taken together these studies lend support to the notion that
premotor processing is strongly tied the phenomenology of action
and effect binding. Thus, it is possible that individuals with low
NPI scores experience lower levels of motor preparation or differ
in their predictive processing compared to those with moderate
NPI scores.
In addition to the possible role of prediction, it has also been
shown that the binding of outcomes back toward actions can
be the result of inferential processes that take into account the
probability of actions producing effects. In this sense, binding
is brought about not by prediction, but by a postdictive process
(e.g., Wegner, 2002). For example, when additional effects occur
that are not linked to actions, effect binding is reduced compared
to when these additional non-action related effects do not occur
(Moore et al., 2009). The manner in which the pre-SMA might
contribute to postdictive processes remains to be elucidated,
and given current knowledge of pre-SMA function, a predictive
influence on binding may be more likely. Another important
finding that fits well with our current results is that when an
agent has a strong prior belief that they will cause an outcome,
they show stronger effect binding (Desantis et al., 2011). In our
experimental context, this result suggests that those with low NPI
scores may have a chronically weak belief in themselves as causal
agents, whereas those with moderate NPI scores have a stronger
chronic belief in themselves as causal agents. As Desantis et al.
(2011) suggested this difference in the strength of a priori beliefs
could affect the reliability that the brain places on predictions
of a forward model. Future work should consider this possibility
further.
Future work could also address these possibilities by
employing neuroimaging to assess the level of preparatory activity
in the SMA (among other areas) in clinical narcissists and by
manipulating the ability to predict sensory consequences of
actions (by varying the probability of an effect occurring, for
example). The suggestion that differences in trait narcissism may
be linked with differences in sensorimotor prediction is, to our
knowledge, relatively novel, and warrants further investigation.
The initial study we present here suffers from several
limitations, some of which have been mentioned above. First,
our sample was smaller than ideal and did not contain any
individuals who scored above 33/40 on the NPI. This may have
reduced differences in between our high and middle group
in particular, which might account for the similar levels of
binding displayed by these groups. Thus, one important follow-
up study will be to recruit individuals whose scores fall along
the full range of the NPI scale with at least 12 participants
per group, and it must be underlined that this study cannot
directly shed light on how clinical narcissists might manifest
in intentional binding tasks. Second, we did not assess other
psychological characteristics that may be correlated with different
levels of narcissism (e.g., self-esteem). Another possibility is that
different facets of narcissism are associated with different facets
of cognition, including agentic dominance or causal reasoning;
involving adaptive and/or maladaptive outcomes (Vonk et al.,
2013). Measuring binding in relation to the subscales of the
NPI may shed further light on variability in perceptual shifts
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within the three groups; although it is still unclear how many
and to what extent the factors in these subscales exist (Ackerman
et al., 2011). We also had a sample that was heavily biased
towards females, who may experience narcissism differently, as
gender differences have been described in other mental illnesses
or trait characteristics (Greaves-Lord et al., 2010; McLean et al.,
2011).
In sum, we report seminal results demonstrating a relationship
between scores on a personality scale, the NPI and intentional
binding. These results show that different scores on the NPI are
associated with changes in the subjective experience of sensory
effects produced by voluntary actions. Thus, to the extent that
binding indexes agency, our results also provide evidence that
low-level, pre-reflective agency is lower in individuals who score
lower on the NPI compared to their counterparts who have
moderate scores on the NPI. In future studies, measuring the
degree of intentional binding in clinically diagnosed narcissists
could provide insight to their inner most state: are they overly
agentic, confident, and self loving; or are they over compensating
for feelings of worthlessness, low self-esteem and lack of control
(see Bosson et al., 2008)? Indeed, the development of agency
measures that circumvent self-presentational biases could
eventually be valuable in the diagnosis of personality disorders
and may be relevant to new ideas regarding levels of functioning
and assessment criteria in the diagnostic and statistical manual of
mental disorders (DSM-5; see Skodol, 2012). These are questions
that would be hard to address via the use of more traditional
explicit measures that are hampered by self-presentation issues.
Finally, the present work underscores the importance of assessing
individual/personality differences in the performance and
experience of volitional action, which allows the field to move
beyond reliance on group level data.
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